Overview of methods for protecting Web-applications from CSRF vulnerabilities (Cross-Site Request Forgery)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18372/2073-4751.71.17000Keywords:
CSRF-attack, Cross-Site Request Forgery, data protection, Web-applicationAbstract
The article presents a study of methods of protecting Web-applications from CSRF vulnerabilities (Cross-Site Request Forgery). The conducted research showed that Web-developers do not pay enough attention to protection against attacks such as Cross-Site Request Forgery, the authors systematized and proposed a complex of methods of protection against CSRF-attacks, and formed recommendations for Web-application developers to ensure comprehensive protection against CSRF-attacks. The authors suggest using a number of methods, which include: using a CSRF-token in the request body and in the HTTP-header, transferring data in an alternative form without using MIME-types of HTML-forms, checking the Referer header, using the SameSite attribute and confirming sensitive operations by the user.
The proposed methods will allow developers to create secure Web-applications that are invulnerable to CSRF-attacks.
References
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